Arbitration Agreements Can Go Too Far

Strong public policies support the appropriate use of arbitration over litigation in settling legal disputes and in fact, such policies underlie the federal Arbitration Act that said, an agreement to arbitrate disputes is subject to well-established principles rooted in the law of contracts. This means, among other things, that courts will step in and declare void an ostensible agreement to arbitrate if its effects are too heavily weighted in one party’s favor. Two recent examples of this overreaching by the more powerful party illustrate the point.

In the first case, a former employee sued his former employer under the Fair Labor Standards for overtime wages. A federal appellate court pre-vented the employer from enforcing an arbitration agreement that was in the company’s employee handbook. The fatal Haw in the arbitration provision was that rather than being a legitimate contract, the bargain was “illusory.” a legal term meaning that one party, the employer, could effectively avoid its promise 10 arbitrates by amending the provision or even terminating ii alto-ether.

Although the employer was required to provide an official written notice of an-, changes to the handbook, a change-in-terms clause gave the employer the “right to revise, delete, and add to the employee handbook” with retroactive effect. There was no savings clause pending disputes from any changes made by the employer.

In the second case, the lopsided bargain that led a court to declare an arbitration agreement unenforceable was more a matter of dollars and cents. A couple purchased a home, contingent upon a satisfactory home inspection. They engaged the services o\’ a home inspection company, which had an arbitration clause in its standard contract. The couple signed the contract, but its most objectionable parts were tucked away in the contract, either in fine print, or hidden among other clauses, or both. The contract’s provisions relating to arbitration were so one-sided in favor of the home inspection company that it effectively “exculpated” the company from liability in a way that violated public policy. In particular, the contract limited the clients’ recovery from the inspector for a negligent inspection to the S285 contract fee; it also required binding arbitration of any dispute, even requiring the party seeking arbitration to pay, among other costs, an initial arbitration fee of S1,350, plus $450 per day after the first day of a hearing.

In short, clients could well end up paying out in fees and costs many times the maximum amount they could recover from the company. Also influencing the court’s decision were the facts that home inspection services are generally thought suitable for public regulation and that the services provided by home inspectors are a matter of practical necessity for their clients and are crucial to the clients’ decision to purchase a home.

To top it off, the court noted that the wife, who had been primarily responsible for the house purchase, had only a high school diploma and no expertise or experience in home construction and that the couple had never purchased a home and were entirely at the mercy of the inspector, without any means of protection if the inspector performed a careless inspection.